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RECOGNIZING TRANSNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW  
 
Satvinder S. Juss* 
 
In Transnational Law, now written over half a century ago, Philip C. Jessup explained the 
nature of the rules that men live by, observing that, “[a]s man has developed his needs and his 
facilities for meeting his needs, the rules become more numerous and more complicated,” but 
that “[h]istory, geography, preferences, conveniences, and necessity have dictated dispersion 
of the authority to make the rules men live by.” 1 This chapter aims to locate the dispersion of 
authority in a rapidly changing area of law, namely, international refugee law. The centrality 
of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 19512 (hereafter ‘the Refugee 
Convention’) to the definition of the refugee is proclaimed by James Hathaway and Michelle 
Hathaway, in their magisterial The Law of Refugee Status,3 as “both universal and applicable 
to contemporary refugees.” 4   Yet, it is neither ‘universal’ as a definition nor entirely 
“applicable to contemporary refugees” today. There has always been a marked dispersion of 
authority in who gets to say what about refugee law. Goodwin-Gill and McAdam in their 
classic, The Refugee in International Law,5 whilst writing that “[t]he States which acceded to 
or ratified the 1951 Convention agree that the term ‘refugee’ should apply….to any person 
who, broadly speaking, qualifies as refugee under the UNHCR Statute,”6 also then make it 
clear that  “[f]rom the outset, it was recognized that, given its various limitations, the 
Convention definition would not cover every refugee.” 7  In fact, they note early on that 
 
* Professor of Law, Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London. 
1 Philip C. Jessup,  Transnational Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1956), 8.  
2 Article 1A(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 reads:“ As a result of events occurring 
before 1 January 1951 and owing to well- founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is out-side the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” See, Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees 1951, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954), 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html.  
3  James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,  2014). In an earlier work James Hathaway described the Refugee Convention as one “which 
remain the cornerstone of modern international refugee law…” see, James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees 
Under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 91.  
4 Ibid., 1.  
5  Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007).  
6 Ibid., 35.  
7 Ibid., 36. 
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“[r]efugee law… remains an incomplete legal regime of protection.” 8  It is high time, 
therefore, for refugee law to be seen as an eclectic, diverse, multifarious and amorphous 
corpus of law and practices.  Any other conception is misleading. 
 
This chapter sets out to examine the fragmentary nature of international refugee law today 
and argues for a formal recognition of a body of “Transnational Refugee Law” (“TRL”) in 
the absence of a world legislative authority for norm-setting, as well as a world court for the 
interpretation of refugee law. Who makes the “norms” and who are the “actors” making 
them, is a question rarely addressed in mainstream works of refugee law. Neither is it asked 
how “norms” in refugee law evolve under the influence of transnational actors and who the 
new “norm entrepreneurs” are. 
 
To deal with these questions, this chapter will first examine what the regulatory purpose of 
the body of refugee law norms is and how it originated. It will be seen here that following the 
Second World War, when an East-West exodus of refugees began to take place, the focus of 
refugee law was on “persecution” of the asylum-seeker, given the historic concern of 
religious and racial minorities across Europe at the time and the ill-treatment of the Jewish 
peoples in Europe. It was this which led to the form of the Geneva Convention on the Status 
of Refugees 1951.  
 
Second, it will consider how the shift in “actors, norms and processes”9 began to transform 
our understanding of the refugee. In examining the emerging sociology of the field, three 
distinct and clearly identifiable landmarks in the modern landscape of refugee law will be 
scrutinized. First, it will be noted that even a year before the establishment of the UN Statute 
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1950,10 [hereafter “the 
UN Statute”] . which oversaw the promulgation of the Geneva Convention on the Status of 
Refugees 1951, the international community had eschewed any suggestion of a requirement 
of “persecution” for Palestinian refugees, in favour of a clear recognition that they had been 
displaced as a result of armed conflict through a loss of home and had become “war 
 
8 Ibid.,1.  
9 Peer Zumbansen, “Lochner Disembedded: The Anxieties of Law in a Global Context,” Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 20, no. 1 (2013): 29–69. 
10 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res 428(V), UNGAOR, 
Supp No 20, UN Doc A/1775 (1950). 
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refugees” resulting in the United Nations having to establish the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in the Near East for their protection.   This 
was an early recognition of “war refugees” which resonates right into the present day. 
Second, alongside these international developments undertaken by the United Nations, 
individual states continued to find means and methods of accommodating refugees even in 
circumstances where the UNHCR Statute did not apply to the fleeing populations: first, there 
was the exodus of the Chinese refugees from Communist China to Hong Kong which the 
British Government accommodated11; second, there was in 1954 the rebellion of the Algerian 
nationalists against French rule, leading to an exodus of French speaking Algerians of 
European descent which the French accommodated12; third, there was the Hungarian refugee 
crisis of 1956, where Western powers, on seeing the revolt of the Hungarians against Russian 
rule, applied the UNHCR Statute to them, but upon discovering that they were not being 
“persecuted” still allowed them to find sanctuary amongst them13; and fourth, the communist 
victories of 1975 in the former French colonies of Indochina, namely of Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Laos led to some three million “Vietnamese Boat People” fleeing, who could have been 
given sanctuary in various South East Asian countries had a system of effective “burden-
sharing” been put in place, but who in the end were mostly accommodated by the leading 
Western powers of the world.14 These four examples contain important evidence in relation 
to who makes the “norms” and what “types” of norms exist  (in terms of domestic law, 
international treaty law and Conventions, and in  case-law). In addition, they tell a story 
 
11  See Glen Peterson, “The Uneven Development of the International Refugee Regime in Postwar Asia: 
Evidence from China, Hong Kong and Indonesia” Journal of Refugee Studies, (Volume 25, Issue 3, September 
2012) at pp. 326-343. Also see,  John P. Burns, “Immigration from China and the Future of Hong Kong” Asian 
Survey (Univ. of California Press, Vol. 27, No. 6 (Jun., 1987), pp. 661-682 
12 See, Rand Corporation (2013), “Algerian Independence: 1954-1962” in: Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, 
Beth Grill, and Molly Dunegan (eds.), Paths to Victory: Detailed  Insurgency Case Studies (edited, 2013) at pp. 
75-93. See also Arnold Fraleigh, “The Algerian War of Independence”, Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969) 
Vol. 61 (April 27-29, 1967), pp. 6-12 
 
 
13 See, James P. Niessen, “God Brought the Hungarians: Emigration and Refugee Relief in the Light of Cold 
War Religion”, The Hungarian Historical Review (Vol. 6, No. 3, Migration and Refugees, 2017), at pp. 566-
596. See also, Marjoleine Zieck, “The 1956 Hungarian Refugee Emergency, and Early and Instructive Case of 
Resettlement” Amsterdam Law Forum (Vol. 5, Issue 3, Spring 2013) at pp. 45-63 
14 See, Nhia M. Vo, The Vietnamese Boat People, 1954 and 1975-1992 (2005, McFarland Press) esp. at pp. 
115-130. Also see Chan Kwok Bun, “The Vietnamese Boat People in Hong Kong”, in  Robin Cohen, The 
Cambridge Survey of World Migration (CUP, 1995) at pp. 380-385. Particularly valuable also is the the 
UNHCR publication, “Flight for Indo-China” in The State of the World’s Refugees – Chapter 4 (Available at 
https://www.unhcr.org/3ebf9bad0.pdf ) 
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about who the “actors” are who are driving the field of refugee law at critical junctures in 
time. 
 
Third, we will consider how, in the light of the above, we can reflect on the “place” and 
“space” of refugee law, such that we can understand the domain of domestic “place” 
lawmaking, and also the  “space” of transnational contestation. We find that the kinds of 
questions that were asked earlier for example, in the context of the immediate post-World 
War II climate of religious persecution, are not the same questions that are being asked 
today.15  The focus has shifted markedly from assessing the eligibility of refugees on the 
basis of whether then can show “persecution,” to their flight as “war refugees” fleeing the 
“indiscriminate violence” of armed conflict.16  The focus is also on the way in which regional 
solutions, in the form of the EU, can provide a form of “subsidiary protection”17 to those 
migrants who cannot come under the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees 1951. 
These changes, including “the rapid rise of transnational law, the growing interdependence of 
national regimes, and the emergence of large-scale transnational legal practice,”18 further 
illustrate the different background against which we are called upon to reassess and, 
arguably, re-imagine refugee law as transnational.19 
 
15 See Gillian McFadyen, “The Contemporary Refugee: Persecution, Semantics, and Universality”  in Special 
Issue  The 1951 UN Refugee Convention - 60 Years On (2012), pp. 9-35, where (at p.10) she   focuses, ‘ 
particularly upon the notion of the persecution criteria within the Refugee Convention,’ and ‘challenges this 
notion and engages with alternative understandings of refuge ‘  (Available at 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_234569_en.pdf ) 
 
16 See, Hugo Storey, “Armed Conflict in Asylum Law: The ‘War-Flaw’”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, (June 
2012, Vol. 31, No.2,) pp. 1-32;  Jean-Francois Durieux, “Of War, Flows, Laws and Flaws: A Reply to Hugo 
Storey”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, [2012] (vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 161-176)  at p.p. 161-176; and Satvinder s. Juss, 
“Problematising the Protection of War Refugees"  Refugee Survey Quarterly (OUP, Vo.32, No.1, 2013) at pp. 
122-147.  Also see, Violeta Moreno-Lax, “Systematising Systemic Integration: ‘War Refugees’, Regime 
Relations, and a Proposal for a Cumulative Approach to International Commitments” 
Journal of International CriminalJustice (Vol. 12, 2014, pp. 907-929) 
17 See, Jens Vedsted-Hansen, “Complementary or subsidiary protection? Offering an appropriate status without 
undermining refugee protection” (in New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 52,  Evaluation and 






18 Mathias Reimann, “Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law for the International Age,” Tulane Law 
Review 75, no. 4 (2001): 1103-1119, 1106-1107. 
19  For the argument to rethink law in today’s global context as transnational, see Peer Zumbansen, 
Transnational Law as Socio-Legal Theory and Critique: Prospects for “Law and Society” in a Divided World, 
67 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW (2019), 101-152, 109, 149. 
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Fourth, and finally, we will in a concluding section consider: (a) how these interests and 
aspirations have shifted since then; (b) what the role and significance of refugee law is today; 
and (c) what questions refugee law answers today, and which ones it does not answer. We 
will see here first, that states increasingly have to concern themselves with refugees who 
come in the guise of “war refugees” fleeing the “indiscriminate violence” of armed conflicts 
in countries like Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, but also completely new types of threats and 
peril. [references needed to the cases of “climate changes”, and the surge of economic 
refugees from Latin America in the first half of 2019]  However, emerging norms are 
incomplete and lacking actual and effective content because states differ in their responses, 
with some requiring an individualized threat, others look to establish the level of violence, 
and yet others are not interested in individualizing the threat at all.20 We will see, secondly, 
that the efficacy of refugee law is constrained by the fact that most entitlements are only 
available to refugees if they have arrived “lawfully,” and that proving that one can meet the 
conditions set out in the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees 1951 does not 
necessarily guarantee success. We will see that the very purpose of refugee law remains 
contested given that the dichotomy between political refugees and economic migrants or 
displaced persons is still rigorously maintained in refugee law.21  
 
 
20 Satvinder S. Juss, “Problematising the Protection of War Refugees"  Refugee Survey Quarterly (OUP, Vo.32, 
No.1, 2013, pp. 122-147) at p. 125.  Much of the difficulty is inherent in the fact that governments themselves 
violate the rules of war.  Thus, Daniel Krcmaric notes, “[t]he recent Syrian civil war, for example, has been 
devastating for the local population. Pro-regime forces have violated nearly every law of war in a campaign that 
has featured the shelling of residential neighborhoods, the use of chemical weapons against civilians, and other 
atrocities. Some observers estimate that the civilian death toll in Syria is around 500,000.” (Daniel Krcmaric, 
“Varieties of civil war and mass killing: Reassessing the relationship between guerilla warfare and civilian 
victimization”Journal of Peace Research(2018, vol. 55, Issue 1, pp. 18-31) at p. 18. The figures are from Ben 
Taub, “The Assad Files”New Yorker,18thSeptember 2016, at pp.36-49.) Moreover, governments and insurgents 
dominate certain areas, but in others they compete for control. In some cases the army rules by day, but once it 
army retreats back to its barracks, the insurgents come out at night” (see N. Kalyvas, “Wanton and Senseless? 
The Logic of Massacres in Algeria” Rationality and Society(vo. 11, Issue 3, 1999) at pp. 243-285). 
 
21 Animesh Ghosha and Thomas M. Crowley, “Refugees and Immigrants: A human Rights Dilemma” Human 
Rights Quarterly, (vol. 5, August 1983) pp. 327-47. Also, Roger Zetter, “More Labels, Fewer Refugees: 
Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization”, Journal of Refugee Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, June 
2007, Pages 172–192.  Also see,  R Lohrmann,“Migrants, Refugees and Insecurity. Current Threats to Peace?” 
International Migration (Volume 38, Issue 4, September 2000,) at pp.3 -22. Further see, S. Glover C. Gott, Ceri, 
A. Loizillon, J.  Portes, R. Price, Richard . S. Spencer, V.Srinivasan, C. Willis, Carole, “ Migration: an 
economic and social analysis. Published in: Home Office Occasional Papers No. No 67 (January 2001) 




In this way, it is hoped that this chapter will trace, through the earliest transnational legal 
processes, the precise location of TRL. There are four distinctive features, as Harold Koh has 
argued,22 to the transnational legal process, all of which bring out the special nuances of 
TRL: it is non-traditional in that it breaks down the traditional dichotomies of international 
law between domestic and international; it is non-statist in that it includes non-state actors as 
well as state actors; it is dynamic in that it is not static so that it “transforms, mutates, and 
percolates up and down, from the public to the private, from the domestic to the international 
level and back down again;” and it is normative in that new rules emerge, are interpreted, 
internalized, and enforced, thus emphasizing the “normativity of that process.” This is a 
helpful categorization because as Koh reminds us, when it comes to “the transnational legal 
process scholars” their distinctive outlook lies in the fact that they, “are focused on the 
normativity of process, sensitivity to practice, and alive to interdisciplinary theory.”23 
 
THE REGULATORY PURPOSE OF THE BODY OF NORMS AND ITS ORIGINS IN 
REFUGEE LAW 
 
Modern refugee law is traceable to World War II when a movement of East-West refugees 
took place. This displacement of European refugees lasted up to the end of the 1950s. In the 
1970s a second flow of refugees occurred which was mainly intra-South. As Gervase Coles 
points out, these refugee movements have forced the West into an “inheritance of a way of 
thinking and acting which grew out of the circumstances of the two previous periods,”24 
which we will now consider and which as Coles notes, gave way to a fragmentary nature of 
refugee law.25 
 
22 Harold Koh, “Transnational Legal Process,” Nebraska Law Review 75, no.4 (2001):181-207, 184.  
23 Ibid., 207 
24 Gervase Coles,“Approaching the Refugee Problem Today,” in Refugees and International Relations, eds. Gil 
Loescher and Laila Monahan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 373-410, 373.  
25 Ibid., 390-393. See in particular, Colin Harvey, “Is humanity enough? Refugee, asylum seekers and the rights 
regime” in Satvinder S. Juss and Colin Harvey, Contemporary Issues in Refugee Law, (Elgar, 2013) at pp. 68-
90. For a staunch defence of the Refugee Convention itself, see Kristin Walker,  “Defending the 1951 
convention definition of refugee” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, (2003, vol. 17) at pp. 583 – 609.  For 
background reading as to how the post-war refugee system took shape, see the illuminating work of Hannah 
Arendt, “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man”, in The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(New York, 1966) at Chapter 9 at pp. 267-290. Also see, Deborah Perluss and Joan F. Hartman, “Temporary 
Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm”., Virginia Journal of International Law (1985-86, Vol. 26, Issue 3, ) 
at pp. 551-626.  Further see, Kay Hailbronner, “Non-Refoulement and ‘Humanitarian’ Refugees: Customary 




A. The Requirement of  “Persecution” in the Refugee Convention 
 
In the first East-West movement of refugees, which began in the late 1940s, the Western 
countries that formed the majority in the United Nations, set out to reduce the European 
refugee problem. They did this by stipulating that the refugees comply with a requirement of 
“persecution” because it was seen as a satisfactory way “of dealing with the  historic concern 
of religious and racial minorities in Europe, especially the Jews” 26  whose experience in 
Europe had traditionally been one of “persecution.” It is no exaggeration to say, therefore, as 
James Hathaway does, that the requirement to show “persecution” is directly a “product of 
recent Western history”27 even though for a historian like Claudena Skran, the persecution 
requirement is a “deviation from the humanitarian principles of the early phase of refugee 
law.”28 In fact, as Gil Loescher notes the persecution requirement was designed to fit into the 
Western notion of the refugee.29  To approach refugee law in this way has its pitfalls because 
as Mathew Price explains, “the persecution requirement distorted asylum into a political 
instrument to be wielded against the Soviets at the cost of addressing the urgent needs of 
refugees.”30 Others too, like Gervase Coles, have confirmed how the dictates of post-war 
Europe meant that the persecution requirement was “specifically devised for a particular 
geographic problem at a particular time,” so that it was “adopted as being the essential 
characteristic of the new refugee in the belief that this would satisfactorily define European 
asylum seekers, the majority of whom were from Eastern Europe….” 31  On any view, 
therefore, the requirement of “persecution” has corrupted the legal institution by politicizing 
humanitarian action. 
 
Perhaps this was inevitable, given that the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees 1951 
arose as the product of post-World War II Europe, being “born on the ashes of the 
Holocaust,” to use the evocative words of Mathew E. Price. It was against this background 
 
26 Ibid., 375.  
27 James C. Hathaway, Law of Refugee Status (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991), 1.  
28  Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 112, note 33.  
29 Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crises (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 57.  
30 Mathew E. Price, “Recovering Asylum’s Political Roots,” in Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose and Limits 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 24-68 
31 Coles, supra note 13, 374-5.  
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that it was accepted that, “asylum’s function was to protect unfortunates from specifically 
political harms; granting asylum reflected the judgment that the state of origin had abused its 
authority; and asylum was connected to other tactics for reforming or challenging abusive 
regimes…”32 Yet, this was precisely the problem, and one which soon led refugee law to be 
questioned. It was said that, “the Convention with its definition is sometimes described as a 
Cold War product, ‘Eurocentric’ and, if only for these reasons, obsolete” as Jerzy Sztucki 
notes.33  The realization that this is so has been deeply felt right down to present times, so 
that it could rightly be labelled as “incomplete and politically partisan.”34  Or, as another 
scholar puts it, “the entire refugee problem was now seen as one of persecution…”35  This is 
despite his observation that “the experience of the European countries during this century has 
provided abundant evidence of the futility of trying to define a refugee by a particular 
motivation for departure” something which “had no precedent in this century and proved 
inappropriate or unworkable in many subsequent situations.”36  If this is so, then plainly 
alternative conceptions of the refugee had to be sought, where other “norm entrepreneurs” 
such as the states themselves could be identified as playing a role in “norm setting,” and 
where this was done a dispersal of authority away from the United Nations could also be 
tracked. 
 
Coles recognized early that fleeing populations may be more motivated by the desire to 
escape oppression and seriously disturbing events, than by the desire to escape persecution, 
and that did not make them any less refugees. As he explained, “it may be possible to 
maintain that many asylum-seekers or clandestine aliens do not suffer persecution; but what 
is more difficult to maintain in many cases is that they do not come from a society which is 
oppressive and/or seriously disturbed, even violent.”37 In this respect, refugee law is not 
about satisfying the eligibility criteria for entry. This has itself been criticized for its 
opaqueness. Bhupinder Chimni reminds us how the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) carries out Refugee Status Determinations (RSD) in some 80 countries 
but this is  “decision-making that has received relatively little attention” even though it has 
 
32 Price, supra note 19, 57.  
33 Jerzy Sztucki, “Who is a Refugee? The Convention Definition: Universal or Obsolete?” in Refugee Rights 
and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes, eds. Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 55.  
34 Hathaway, supra note 16, 8. 
35 Coles, supra note 13, 375.  
36 Ibid.,385.  
37 Ibid.,386. 
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“grave implications for the life and liberty of individuals”.38 Meanwhile, “[i]n the last decade, 
studies have pointed to lapses in the conduct of RSD by UNHCR.” 39   Relying on the 
pioneering work of Michael Alexander,40 Chimni was able to show how this process does not 
meet “clear standards of transparency” and “needs to be accountable to its beneficiaries.”41 
Valuable as such research is, as Coles argues, if it is oppression and serious disturbances that 
refugees flee from then “the modern refugee problem is not one of eligibility criteria or of 
immigration controls; the problem is, basically that of adverse conditions within the country 
of origin which are forcing people to flee.”42 Satisfying eligibility criteria will not secure 
entry. Who is a refugee and who qualifies as such is a question which will remain shrouded 
in obscurity. This is why Chimni observes that Western responses to the refugee crisis, “may, 
in the final analysis, be seen as an instrument of an exploitative international system which is 
periodically mobilized to address its worst consequences.”43  
 
In the same way, “the attempt to affect events by asserting the claims of individual human 
rights, is largely doomed to failure,” , “when dealing with refugee problems” because 
refugees move from state to state, “[t]he perspective of state-to-state relations, not the relation 
between the individual and the state, becomes critical for the mitigation or solution of refugee 
crisis.”44 This suggests that the nation-state system acts to prevent an international authority 
from solving the problem of refugees. Insofar as international agencies have existed, from the 
League of Nations to the United Nations, they are created by states, and are constitutive of 
the states themselves, with the result that these states will not relinquish their sovereign right 
to determine who lives in them and who does not.45 Unsurprisingly then, eminent refugee 
 
38 B.S. Chimni, “Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law,” New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 37, no.4 (2005): 799-828, 819.  
39 Ibid.,820.  
40 Michael Alexander, “Refugee Status Determination Conducted By the UNHCR,” International Journal of 
Refugee Law 11, no. 2 (1999): 251-289, 286-87.  
41 Chimni, supra note 27, 821.  
42 Coles, supra note 13, 387. 
43 B.S. Chimni, “From Settlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards A Critical History of Durable Solutions 
to Refugee Problems,”Refugee Survey Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2004): 55-73, 56.  
44 Jack I. Garvey, “Toward a Reformulation of International Refugee Law,” Harvard International Law Journal 
26, no. 2 (1985): 483-574, 484.  
45  Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 7,9. 
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lawyers have openly acknowledged, that “the increasingly marginal relevance of international 
refugee law [which] has in practice signaled a shift to inferior or illusory protection.”46   
 
These shortcomings were well known to advocates of the Refugee Convention of 1951. 
Western countries at the end of World War II were using the United Nations to deal with 
their own problems and so they deliberately made “some apparent concessions to 
universality,” but these remained “inevitably arbitrary and fraught with problems since the 
new approach was specifically devised for a particular geographical problem at a particular 
time.”47  So, it was well known to all concerned that “the approach was not universal, but 
regional and provisional: it was not a model for general application.”48  In this way, there first 
followed the 1950 UNHCR Statute. and then the 1951 Refugee Convention. These required 
refugees to show (i) that there was persecution; (ii) that it was individually directed and not 
group targeted; (iii) that external settlement would be the solution; and (iv) that the refugees 
had to be outside their country of origin.49 Thus was the modern law on refugees crafted by 
the international community.   
 
The refugee problem could not, however, be resolved through the use of the law alone. And 
yet, it was the ultimate conceit of the international community to think that it could. A 
salutary reminder was provided by none other than Michel Foucault, who whilst recognizing 
how “[i]n Western societies since the Middle Ages, the exercise of power has always been 
formulated in terms of law,”50 also added the sobering caveat that, “[w]e have been engaged 
for centuries in a type of society in which the juridical is increasingly incapable of coding 
power, as serving as its system of representation.”51 One may wonder, then, at the wisdom of 
framing the refugee problem as a fundamentally legal one insofar as its essential attributes 
and architecture are concerned.  Simon Roberts aptly observed that “it has proved very 
difficult, despite sustained attempts to do so, to talk confidently about law in the case of the 
acephalous orders of the pre-state/non-state world or about local level-orderings within 
 
46 James C. Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve, “Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal 
for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 10 (1997), 115-211, 116.  
47 Coles, supra note 13, 374. 
48 Ibid.   
49 Thus exhibiting an “exile bias” to refugee law (see Coles’ unflinching criticism of this at supra note 13, 391-
392, 402). 
50 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Allen Lane, 1978), 87.  
51 Ibid., 89.  
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centralized polities.” 52   The unresolved identity of “the anthropology of law” and the 
problematic character of subsequent attempts to delineate “plural” legal orders testifies 
clearly to that difficulty.”53 The result, as this author has elsewhere argued, is a “lack of 
clarity in the way in which ‘knowledge’ systems in the world are conceived, constructed and 
perceived.” Contrary to the expectations of most lawyers, this state of affairs results in 
“refugee law having an equivocal authority before courts and tribunals” and “this impacts 
adversely on the global resolution of major problems of international law and governance.” 54 
Accordingly, if we are to comprehend the methodical underpinnings of Transnational 
Refugee Law today, then we must desist the urge to locate them in the established formal 
mechanisms, through which we normally determine the pedigree of international legal norms. 
Instead we must identify these rules in the wider international regulatory activity.  This is 
characterised by variation, pliability, dexterity, and customization.  Yet, it is still efficacious 
all the same.  It still retains the efficacy to have normative effect. In short, we must get used 
to the existence of equivocal authority.  
 
B. The Shift in “Actors, Norms and Processes” and the Changing Sociology of the Field 
 
1. The Palestinian Crisis 
It is a paradox all too often overlooked that in 1949, a year before the UN Statute of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1950 was enacted, the 
Palestinian Arabs were recognised as ‘refugees,’ without the need of having to prove that 
they had been specifically  ‘persecuted,’ provided only that they could show that they had 
lost their home in Palestine, as a result of the 1948 conflict.  This underscores an 
understanding, within the international community, of the need to develop TRL in a way that 
was not just simple, but also customised,  to the real life situation of  the Palestinian refugee 
who had become displaced.  The result was that  “[n]o particular motivation for leaving or 
remaining abroad formed part of the criterion for a Palestinian to qualify as a refugee; 
merely, the loss of home” and, “[t]he question of solution was left open.”55 Yet, already at 
 
52 Simon Arthur Roberts, “After Government? On Representing Law Without the State,” Modern Law Review 
68, no. 1 (2005): 1-24, 17. 
53 Ibid.   
54 Satvinder s. Juss, “The UNHCR Handbook and the interface between ‘soft’ law and ‘hard’ law in 
international refugee law” in Satvinder S. Juss and Colin Harvey, Contemporary Issues in Refugee Law (Elgar, 
2013) pp. 31-67, at p. 33 
55 Coles, supra note 13, 375.  
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that time, the international community had decided upon the need to have to disperse its 
authority so as to be able to work through different actors and processes, if it was to succeed 
in alleviating the developing problem of displaced refugees elsewhere on globe. It displayed 
pliability and dexterity by adopting a variegated approach.  On the one hand it was willing to 
countenance a scenario whereby,  only a year before the resolution of East-West refugees in 
Europe was addressed by the 1951 Refugee Convention, those who had been displaced from 
Palestine as refugees would be designated as “Mandate refugees” and fall under “the mandate 
of the UN agency established to deal with the problem, [namely] UNRWA.”56 On the other 
hand, however, it had determined to establish that all other refugees (being non-Palestinian) 
would fall under the aegis of the Refugee Convention 1951, so that they would be known as 
“Convention refugees,” where in order to succeed, they would have to meet the requirement 
of showing that they had been specifically subjected to “persecution” for a “well-founded 
reason” if they were to succeed in their claims for refugee status. 
The two regimes of refugee law were distinctly dissimilar from each other. For Palestinians it 
was armed conflict which was the immediate cause of their refugee situation, and to this day 
the position of Palestinian refugees, in recognition of the conflict of 1948 which displaced 
them, is still covered by General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 
through which the United Nations established the UNRWA in the Near East.57  Even after so 
many years of intractability, UNRWA's mandate is renewed every three years and its area of 
operations comprises five “fields”: Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan, the West 
Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. The approach to the Palestinian Refugee 
crisis in 1949 aptly illustrates how, “the vast majority of all persons externally displaced by 
events occurring in Europe between the beginning of World War I and the end of World War 
II were “war refugees.”58  According to Coles this is because non-Western and socialist 
countries at the time, “either rejected the Western approach or regarded it as relevant only to 
the European refugee situation.”59 Nevertheless, with respect to Palestinian refugees, working 
out who would or would not benefit from UNRWA’s mandate remains, after all these years, a 
 
56 Ibid.  
57 This dealt with Resolution 212 (III), Assistance to Palestine refugees, GA Res 212, UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, UN 
Doc A/RES/212(III) (1948), which  set up the United Nations Relief for Palestinian Refugees to provide 
immediate temporary assistance for such persons.  
58 Coles, supra note 13, 375. 
59 Ibid.  
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matter of not inconsiderable complexity and difficulty. 60  The case of Al-Khatib v The 
Secretary of State for the Home Department 61  has recently confirmed that Palestinian 
refugees continue to face an uphill struggle in securing entitlement to subsidiary protection, 
as a formerly habitually resident in Syria, who had been living in the United Kingdom since 
2007, discovered. 
 
2. State Actors and the Search for a New “Norm” Setting 
 
Four events occurred outside Europe soon after the 1951 Refugee Convention that 
demonstrate how Western countries took measures which amounted to an outright rejection 
of that regime. These four events are often overlooked in present-day discussions of modern 
refugee law practice, despite showing the role of the State as an actor in shaping refugee law 
and how different methodologies for refugee determination are being applied across national 
jurisdictions. What this tells us is that transnational processes were not just confined to the 
international plane, but played out on the domestic plane as well: the nation-state  did not 
disappear in the international evolution of refugee law practices. But, it disaggregated by  
breaking up into different components. It is important to acknowledge this background, 
which Anne-Marie Slaughter famously depicted in her 2004 book, A New World Order, in 
our attempt to retrace the origins of an emerging transnational refugee law. Addressing an 
audience of both international relations scholars and international lawyers, Slaughter warned 
against the perception that the advent of  globalization correlated with the end of the nation-
state. Instead, she posited that “the state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating” in that “its 
component institutions…are all reaching out beyond national borders in various ways, 
finding out that their once ‘domestic’ jobs have growing international dimension.”62 In the 
light of this differentiated observation, Slaughter envisioned “a world order in which hope 
and despair, crime and charity, ideas and ideals are transmitted around the globe through 
 
60 The Handbook notes that, although UNRWA is currently the only organ or agency other than the UNHCR 
that is providing protection or assistance under Article 1D, there was previously one other such body (the United 
Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency) and there could, potentially, be other such bodies in the future. 
61 Al-Khatib v The Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2016] ScotCS CSIH 85.  
62 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (New Haven, CT: Princeton University Press, 2004), 31. She 
suggests (at p.1) that, “government networks are a key feature of world order in the twenty-first century, but 
they are underappreciated, under-supported, and underused to address the central problems of global 
governance.” 
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networks of people and organizations.”63 Today, about a decade and a half after her book was 
published, the association of globalization with the ‘disaggregated state’ already seems to 
have entered, at least in part, the archive of international political theory. At a time, where we 
are confronted with more and more references to the alleged ‘end of globalization’ 64, we 
discover ourselves to be in an ever more volatile state of uncertainty with regard to who holds 
the cards in the complex landscape of global governance, the return of nationalism and the 
rise of populism worldwide. Nevertheless, Slaughter’s work and that of others, who focused 
on the emergence of increasingly specialized and sector-specific regulatory regimes 65 , 
marked a crucial point of observation and analysis of a situation in which the field of relevant 
and powerful actors in governance and policy making had become more crowded and more 
complex. The tension-ridden co-existence of national and international politics, on the one 
hand, and of specific, allegedly ‘technical’ rules of procedure that govern matters of border 
control, administration of refugee flows, housing and welfare, on the other, oftentimes 
remains hidden from plain sight. And, it is sometimes only in the context of a more widely 
perceived and publicized ‘crisis’ with regard to, say, ‘border security’, that the complexity of 
the disciplinary regulatory regime that makes up much of TRL becomes tangible.66 
But, let’s return to the earlier, post World War II, history of refugee regulation. First, there 
was the exodus of the Chinese refugees from Communist China to Hong Kong.  This 
occurred when the Communist party took full control of mainland China in 1949 and 
refugees fled across the open border, in what Edvard Hambro, in 1957, described by 
observing that, “nowhere is the refugee problem less dramatised, or even unknown to many 
Westerners.”67 The United Kingdom determined that they did not come within the ambit of 
the UNHCR Statute, because resettlement opportunities for Chinese refugees outside Hong 
Kong were unrealistic. There were also political and security factors at stake, so the 1951 
 
63 Ibid., 271 
64 See, for example, Michael Cox, “The rise of populism and the crisis of globalization: Brexit, Trump and 
beyond”, Irish Studies in International Affairs vol. 28 (2017): 9-17. 
65 See, for example, Tim Bartley, “Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of Public 
and Private Standards”, Theoretical Inquiries in Law vol. 11 no. 1 (2011): 517-542, and Marie-Laure Djelic and 
Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, “Transnational Governance in the Making: Regulatory Fields and Their Dynamics,” 
Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation (2006): 1–47. 
66 For a compelling critique of these constellations and their dynamics in the field of international migration law, 
see Sarah Dehm, in this volume. 
67 Edvard Hambro, “Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong,” The Phylon Quarterly 18, no. 1 (1957): 69-81, 69.  
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Refugee Convention was made to fall into abeyance, and a different approach was devised.68 
Needs an additional reference 
Second, in 1954 Algerian nationalists rebelled against French rule. This led to the Algerian 
War of Independence in 1962.  Some ten per cent of the overall Algerian population 
(amounting to 1 million French Algerians) left for sanctuary in France. Such was the role of 
the French state here that Peter Gatrell has suggested that France actually helped “the 
construction of the Sahrawi refugee identity.”69 They did so by accommodating Sahrawi 
refugees, as they were Christians, and descendants of the French, Spanish and Mediterranean 
peoples of Northwest Africa. Accordingly, France did not wish the UNHCR Statute to apply 
to them.  
Third, and even more interestingly, the Hungarian refugee crisis of 1956 differed both from 
the Chinese and Algerian exodus. Here Western powers, on seeing the revolt of the 
Hungarians against Russian rule, immediately applied the UNHCR Statute, with a 
programme of resettlement to follow. However, after most had fled to Austria, the 
Hungarians then expressed the desire to return back to their homeland once the security 
situation had improved. This meant they could no longer show “persecution” in Hungary.  
Austria did not force them to return but called on states to help resettle them with both 
financial and physical help.  This was done so well and so very quickly and by such a large 
number of states that it has been described by Marjoleine Zieck as, “the first large-scale 
resettlement under the present legal regime.” In this way, the Hungarian refugee crisis not 
only contrasts with contemporary resettlement practice, “that is characterised by a scarcity of 
resettlement places and few resettlement states,” 70  it also shows the irrelevance of the 
Refugee Convention in the first large-scale resettlement program after World War II. It is a 
telling example of a “legal transfer,” such that in the words of David Nelken,  
“[i]n all but the most technical of legal transfers there are likely to be 
conflicting interests at stake, involving different governments or different 
economic interests …” for example, but that “the most fundamental question 
from which there is no escape is who gets to determine what is meant by 
success” and that “[s]ucess will …turn on the ability of one group to impose 
 
68 Laura Madokoro, “Surveying Hong Kong in the 1950s: Western humanitarians and the ‘problem’ of 
Chinese refugees” Modern Asian Studies, (Volume 49, Issue 2 March 2015) at pp. 493-524 
69 Peter Gatrell, The Making of the Modern Refugee (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 228.  
70 Marjoleine Zieck, “The 1956 Hungarian Refugee Emergency, an Early and Instructive Case of Resettlement,” 
Amsterdam Law Forum 5, no. 2 (2013): 45-63, 45. 
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its interpretation of the outcome of the particular transfer or ademption and tell 
a convincing story of what has occurred.” 71  
In all  three of these cases discussed so far, national governments successfully managed to 
impose their own interpretation of the ideal outcome of refugee administration. 
There was, however, also a fourth event, “which proved to be a watershed.”72 This event 
occurred at the end of the period described above and emerged from the upheavals that 
followed the communist victories in 1975 in the former French colonies of Indochina, namely 
of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.73 These caused such turmoil that over the next two decades 
more than three million people fled from these countries, in what became popularly known as 
the “Vietnamese Boat People.” Their plight has been well documented by Leo Goodstadt, 
who recounts the exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam as a struggle for power in South 
East Asia between the USA, the Soviet Union and China.74 The political interests of the 
major powers were directly involved and the USA wished to find a speedy solution, even 
though the Western powers’ first reaction was to call them, not refugees at all, but “boat 
people.” What happened here, however, was that the South-eastern states most immediately 
affected, such as Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, did not help in the burden-sharing and 
accommodation of these refugees. Their rejection by these countries consequently generated 
a huge amount of  Western media attention, as they were driven away from foreign shores, 
with the result that “they finally succeeded in almost entirely transferring the onus of settling 
these people onto Western countries.” 75  The settlement program was undertaken by the 
UNHCR, which for the first time negotiated an Orderly Departure Programme,76making for 
family reunion and safe exodus. This did little to curb the refugee flows themselves. It was 
the West which had to shoulder the burden of refugee flows. In the process, the UNHCR had 
 
71 David Nelken, “The Meaning of Success in Transnational Legal Transfers,” Windsor Yearbook of Access to 
Justice 19 (2001): 349-366, 363.  
72 Coles, supra note 13, 379.  
73 Russell H. Fifield, “The Thirty Years War in Indochina: A Conceptual Framework”, Asian Survey (Vol. 17, 
No. 9, Sep., 1977),at  pp. 857-879.  Also see, Bruce Grant, The Boat People (London, Penguin Books, 1979)  
74 Leo Goodstadt, “Race, Refugees and Rice - China and the Indo‐China Triangle,” The Commonweatlh Journal 
of International Affairs 68, no. 271 (1978): 253-260.  
75 Coles, supra note 13, 157.  
76  “In the case of Vietnam, an Orderly Departure Programme was devised, whereby the Vietnamese authorities 
agreed to permit the orderly departure of individuals to resettlement countries, to avoid the clandestine and 
dangerous departures by sea. The programme marked the first occasion in which UNHCR became involved in 
efforts to pre-empt a refugee problem rather than simply dealing with its aftermath.” See United Nations High 
Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR), “Flight from Indochina,” in The State of the World’s Refugees 2000: 
Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
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by the end of the 1970s overnight transformed itself to an organisation with “an assistance 
budget” of “nearly one hundred times what it had been less than ten years before.”77  This 
transformation contrasted sharply with its presence as a small European migration agency 
during both the first period of the East-West flow of European refugees and the second period 
of intra-South refugee movements, during which it had been little more than a modest 
assistance body.  
The transformation of the UNHCR in this way was not without costs, because it was during 
this time that the UNHCR Statute looked antiquated and obsolete especially in Third World 
situations. Despite this, as Coles explains, “[n]o one, however, was willing to try to amend 
the Statute, and the Convention was widely seen as having at least some political and 
symbolic value.”78 This is particularly so given that the Western countries no longer enjoyed 
a majority in the UN General Assembly, preferring neither to re-negotiate the UNHCR 
Statute nor to develop a coherent body of international refugee law.  
Today, if refugee law looks out-dated and anachronistic, it is in no small part due to the 
decisions taken at that time in the past. The fact is that Western powers long ago chose 
inaction over action because “they saw their interests as served by a continuation of the status 
quo” and “[n]o one else was interested in a global initiative, preferring regional means 
instead.”79 A global initiative would have seen the UNHCR Statute amended as soon as  
refugee movements shifted from Europe to the Third World.  Most of these movements were 
either the result of rebellions by colonised populations against their Western colonial masters, 
or they arose directly from the instability which followed immediately after they had gained  
independence, with which they were invariably beset in the newly liberated countries in their 
bitter taste of freedom. Even though Western countries were no longer in a majority in the 
UN General Assembly they remained resistant to renegotiating the Statute because they were 
now receiving refugees from these countries over which they had previously exercised 
control .  They accordingly remained steadfastly unwilling to develop a truly international 
system of refugee law.  Had they done so, such a system could have embraced  the plight of 
such refugees as the Vietnamese Boat People, in a new revamped refugee Convention which 
included groups like  ‘war refugees’ and those fleeing civil war situations. Western 
 
77 Coles, supra note 13, 381.  
78 Ibid., 383.  
79 Ibid.  
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dominance on the international plane, as the next section below shows, could only be 
countered at regional levels, where bold initiatives were taken just ten years after the Refugee 
Convention 1951 was passed by the  African countries who wanted to address their own 
particular refugee problems in a way that the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees 
1951 did not. A little over a decade later, Latin America did the same.  
These two regional have exposed the poverty of  an international law which has focused on 
solutions to world problems being provided by state actors and institutions only.  They 
brought home the realisation that different actors and norm entrepreneurs were called for who 
could find a place and space for refugee law elsewhere. This realisation became all the more 
irresistible to resist  once the UNHCR Statute showed itself as not fit for the task of 
effectively addressing a dramatic refugee problem of global proportions at the end of a 
deepening ideological divide on the one hand and the rhetoric and normative embrace of the 
idea of ‘universal human rights’, on the other. The result has been a distinct  “move of 
international society, from an essentially negative code of rules of abstention,” to use the 
words of Friedman, “to positive rules of co-operation, however, fragmentary in the present 
state of world politics…”80  In this way, refugee law has become an example of what has 
later been alluded to as “the concerns among international lawyers about ‘legal 
fragmentation,’” which become strikingly visible in the situation where “the absence of a 
world government radicalizes the governance dilemma facing modern societies.” 81 It is in 
that moment that the recognition of a missing ‘world government’ is not merely concerned 
with the institutional question of actors and political infrastructure on the global level, but 
instead begins to encompass the question of where the legitimation basis might be found for 
this interplay of domestic and international, public and private power brokers in the face of a 
rising number of refugees. Shifting, thus, the emphasis away from the sole focus on ‘control’, 
the refugee ‘problem’ would eventually come to be appreciated also as one of ‘agency’ – 
with regard to those who are subjected to the rules.82 It is here where this sketched idea of a 
transnational refugee law reconnects back to one of transnational law’s foundational 
 
80 Wolfgang Friedman, The Changing Structure of International Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1964), 62.  
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82 See, again, Dehm, above. 
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normative dimensions, namely  “the improvement of participatory elements can strengthen 
the democratic foundations of global governance institutions.”83  
 
3. Third World Regional Responses  
 
Further regulatory change was driven by the 1970s refugee movements from the Global 
South to the North. And yet, it was predominantly Western countries that were UN-donor and 
refugee-receiving countries, which steered and controlled the agenda for the evolving 
international refugee policy, utilizing their financial and political power to this end. The 
South-North refugee movements themselves were the result of armed conflicts arising 
between Western colonial powers and indigenous revolutionary movements.84 To break this 
dominance, African countries created their own regional refugee system resulting, eventually 
in  “one of the world’s most flexible and innovative refugee instruments”85, the  Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa It extended the narrow scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention to include even people 
who were fleeing “events seriously disturbing public order.” Thus after setting out in Section 
1 the definition of a refugee postulated by the !951 refugees Convention, with its emphasis on 
‘persecution; for a ‘well-founded reason’ for one of the five adumbrated grounds,  it also set 
out in Section 2 its own larger definition in words that, ‘The term “refugee” shall also apply 
to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or 
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.’86 
 
Given the tumultuous and violent consequences and fall-outs that accompanied Africa’s 
decolonization process in the 1960s, the OAU found itself tasked with the heavy burden of 
articulating an adequate refugee protection regime. Such a regime would have to be drafted in 
acknowledgement of the specific colonial and post-colonial African context, so that,  
 
the term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing 
public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, 
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is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.87 
 
 
This unique definition explicitly introduces objective criteria, based on the conditions 
prevailing in the country of origin, for determining refugee status, and “requires neither the 
elements of deliberateness nor discrimination as they are inherent in the 1951 Convention 
definition.” 88  As Coles puts it, “this definition is so wide as, in many cases, to make 
individual determinations of status a mere formality.”89  
In a little over a decade after the OAU Convention of 1969, Latin America too passed the 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 1984.90 Such is its regional importance that many in 
South America continue to look to it for the resolution of their current refugees crisis, 
including during the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis of 2018.91  The 1984 Cartagena Declaration 
is a non-binding regional instrument which followed the “Colloquium on International 
Protection for Refugees and Displaced Persons in Central America, Mexico and Panama”92, 
held in Colombian in 1984.93  Whilst it affirmed the importance of the right to asylum, the 
principle of non-refoulement and the importance of finding durable solutions, it did so in a 
way which  also allowed for a broader category of persons in need of international protection 
to be considered as refugees, than  either the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol 
had done. Echoing what the 1969 OAU Convention in Africa had already announced, under 
1984 Cartagena Declaration refugees were defined as “persons who have fled their country 
because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign 
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aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances 
which have seriously disturbed public order,”94 
Both the OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration are predicated on protection from 
oppression and serious disturbances, which James Hathaway acknowledged as being a 
fundamental reason for why people flee their homes. Ironically, both definitions are today 
employed by UNHCR in its operations in Africa, 95  itself a telling affirmation of the 
significance of TRL. It may well be asked why, however, given the severe limitations 
imposed by the requirement of “persecution” in the 1951 Refugee Convention, this altogether 
more realistic conceptualization of the modern refugee was not adopted in the West in their 
legal systems. The obvious answer to this question is that international refugee law has never 
served the interests of its consumers or its ‘subjects,’ but rather is geared towards maintaining 
the status quo in the hegemonic dominance of the western refugee receiving donor countries, 
who control its legal design for their own ends and purposes.96  
 
What the developments above nevertheless  point to is a need for a more explicit acceptance 
of a plurality of normative backgrounds for the formulation of any forward-looking refugee 
law regime in the future. Once we begin adopting such a perspective, it becomes possible to 
see the evolution of refugee law as taking place, in effect, against a still more differentiated 
background – historically, politically but also normatively. Echoing the post-colonial turn in 
present-day transnational legal studies97, it is important to appreciate the hidden historical 
corpses (as in the work done by the TWAIL movement98) in the evolutionary accounts of 
international legal normativity and the continuing blind spots with regard to subaltern and 
“alternative knowledges”99 and how the dominant conceptual line-drawing excludes relevant 
knowledge from being taken into account. It is in light of such a critical approach to 
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dominant historical and normative narratives, that a project such as TRL can play a key role 
in the search for new legitimacy foundations and a more inlusive law in a global context. 
After all, as Zumbansen argued, “[i]t is not that the utopian lawyer pushes against a citadel of 
self-assured, parochial doctrinal framework in the name of an as-yet impossible, unthinkable, 
out-of-the world legal imagination,” but that rather this line-drawing, “which is done through 
the identification of what belongs to a legal ‘field’ and what falls through the cracks” is 
something which “denies any such utopia from the start by establishing an entire universe of 
self-sufficient legal reproduction.”100  I have myself elsewhere referred to this phenomenon 
as the “[P]olitics of Knowledge Recognition,”101  whereby some forms of knowledge are 
excluded, but others willingly embraced by those in power. And yet, given the limits of 
traditional law, as highlighted by Steiner & Vagts, 102  it is now clear that “classical 
international law is often inadequate to the contemporary world’s problems,” it was surely 
only a matter of time before non-Western countries developed their own approaches. After 
all, by the mid-20th century European countries had become minority members of the world 
community and the members of the United Nations, comprising no less than  120 states from 
every corner of the world, and having the most  divergent  aims and interests, came now to 
represent a vast array of different  cultures ideologies, which were difficult to reconcile with 
those of the classical West.  It is time, therefore, that the international community learnt to 
recognize a substantively wider range of knowledge frameworks than those usually drawn 
upon in reference to the universal status of human rights.103 A transnational refugee law 
worthy of its name could be a crucial lever in this effort.  
 
4. The UNHCR intervenes to assist Western State Parties.  
Notwithstanding the major developments that had already taken place in the 1950s and 
1960s, at both state and regional levels, most legal positivists in the world continued to 
 
100 Peer Zumbansen, “The Politics of Relevance: Law, Translation and Alternative Knowledges,” Osgoode Hall 
Law School Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Research Paper No. 45/2013 (2013),  
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1287&context=clpe.  
101 Satvinder Singh Juss, “The UNHCR Handbook and the interface between ‘soft law’ and ‘hard law’ in 
international refugee law,” in Contemporary Issues in Refugee Law, eds. Satvinder Singh Juss and Colin Harvey 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013), 31-67, 38-41. 
102  Henry J. Steiner and Detlev F. Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems, 2nd ed. (Mineola, New York: 
Foundation Press, 1976), 330. 
103 For the possibilities of other perspectives that exist , see: Radoslav Stojanovic, “The Emergence of the Non-
Aligned Movement: A View from Belgrade”, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law  (vo. 13, Issue 
3, 1981) at pp. 443-450. 
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maintain that the 1951 Geneva Convention,104 supplemented by its 1967 Protocol,105 is the 
primary source of modern refugee law. However, there remained considerable uncertainty 
about what had been agreed in the final text of the Refugee Convention 1951. This is 
unsurprising given that  , “the successive drafts were subject to continual changes in the light 
of comments by governments and specialist agencies.” 106  As the Courts too began to 
discover, it was unclear whether the changes in language “were intended to reflect a change 
in substance” or whether they were “intended to reflect the same meaning in different 
words.” From “a lawyers point of view” the changes were “inconclusive” and when looking 
at the meaning of the text of the Convention, the Courts could be heard saying that, literally, 
“we do not know.”107  This uncertainty was eventually settled, inter alia, by the UNHCR. As 
we have seen, the Office of the UNHCR was created on 14 December 1950 by Resolution 
428 (V) of the United Nations General Assembly, and it is a subsidiary organ of the United 
Nations under Article 22 of the UN Charter, such that the functions of the Office of the 
UNHCR are defined in its Statute.108 This means that UNHCR is the body charged with the 
task of supervising international conventions that provide for the protection of Refugees. In 
1979, the UNHCR first published its Handbook  Relating to the Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status 109  (hereafter “the Handbook”). The publication itself was the result of a 
request to the UNHCR by state parties to have the UNHCR provide them with guidance on 
the meaning and interpretation of the text of the Convention. This confirms the role of 
domestic transnational actors, participating as norm entrepreneurs to help develop the 
meaning of key concepts of a modern refugee law. The range of the issues addressed in the 
book is telling of the importance of this process of norm-setting. There is guidance in the  
 
104 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, supra note 2. http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/vlcrs.htm.  
105 The re-edited version of the 1979 Handbook, which was issued in 1992, runs into 223 paragraphs, with six 
annexures: see the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, UN Doc HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 4 (1992). It was re-issued again in 2011. The current version 
is available as of 2012 at: “Updated UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees,” Refugee Archives @ UEL, Feb. 22, 2012, 
http://refugeearchives.wordpress.com/2012/02/22/updated-unhcr-handbook-and-guidelines-on-procedures-and-
criteriafor-determining-refugee-status-under-the-1951-convention-andthe-1967-protocol-relating-to-the-status-
of-refugees/. “The current version is available as of February 2019 at: 
https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/3d58e13b4/handbook-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-status-
under-1951-convention.html.”  
106 Per Lord Lloyd in Secretary of State For The Home Department, Ex Parte Adan (R v Secretary of State For 
The Home Department Ex Parte Aitseguer), [2000] UKHL 67.  
107 Ibid.  
108 As explained in the case of  Bolbol v Hivatal, C-31/09, [2010] ECR I-5539 at para 14 [Bolbol].  
109 Supra note 76.  
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Handbook on pre-Convention refugee law concerns, As State Parties  had requested clear 
guidance on how to deal with ‘pre-Convention’ refugees, such as the Palestinians, the 
Handbook explains that after 1951 they are to be designated as  ‘mandate refugees’ and as 
such  are excluded from consideration as ‘Convention’ refugees and this is made clear in  
Article 1D of the Refugee Convention. The result is that in Bolbol v Hivatal 110 the Court of 
Justice of the European communities (CJEU) adhered to this guidance by quoting directly 
from the Handbook that, “UNRWA operates only in certain areas of the Middle East, and that 
it is only there that its protection or assistance are given.” Using the assistance gleaned from 
the Handbook, the Court was able to explain how “a refugee from Palestine who finds 
himself outside that area does not enjoy the assistance mentioned and may be considered for 
determination of his refugee status under the criteria of the 1951 Convention.” The 
Handbook, as the Court noted, makes it clear  that, “it should normally be sufficient to 
establish that the circumstances which originally qualified him for protection or assistance 
from UNRWA still persist and that the cessation and exclusion clauses do not apply to 
him.”111 This then, is a specific  example of the Office of the UNHCR impacting on the 
development of TRL in a difficult area of international refugee policy which formal law does 
not reach.  
 
Over the years, several Courts have expressed their appreciation with regard to the 
Handbook’s guidance across a range of refugees related issues, ranging  from international 
humanitarian law112 to the exclusion of refugee status113, as well as from the credibility 
assessments of unaccompanied minors114 to the internal relocation of refugees.115 Arguably, 
the Handbook has become part of the transnational legal order in terms of providing an 
authoritative, normative reference. This is all the more remarkable the more we recognize 
that it performs its role as guide for norm-setting outside the province of traditional 
international law.116 A number of textbooks give the Handbook a special status, such as 
 
110 Bolbol, supra note 79.  
111 Ibid., at para 17.  
112 See  QD (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2009] EWCA Civ 620 [QD]. 
113 Bolbol, supra note 80. 
114 U. & Anor -v- MJELR & Anor, [2010] IEHC 317.  
115 See, AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2007] UKHL 49.  
116 Indeed, the one time Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Bingham, even wrote an essay on how the judicial 
determination of factual issues is undertaken, where he drew  attention to the Handbook: see,  Lord Thomas 
Bingham, “The Judge as Juror: the Judicial Determination of Factual Issues,” Current Legal Problems 38, no. 1 
(1985): 1-27. 
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Fordham’s, Judicial Review Handbook117, Symes and Jorro’s, Asylum Law and Practice,118 
de Smith, Woolf and Jowell’s, Judicial Review of Administrative Action,119 and Macdonald 
and Toal’s, Macdonald’s Immigration Law and Practice.120  
 
Indeed, as international refugee law becomes more complex and cumbersome the role of the 
Office of the UNHCR can be seen to have effectively contributed to the emergence of a 
domain of TRL. It is clear that this is not so much a field that has come into existence 
through substantive or procedural extension of the body of laws which were already in 
existence, but a realm that has developed through a reconceptualization of refugee law as a 
methodological critique.  This is precisely why TRL incorporates not only the socio-legal 
account of hard/soft, domestic/international, public/private ANPs, but – crucially – also is 
based on the critique of the normatively exclusionary basis of traditional law, which 
continues to ignore what I have referred to above as  “alternative knowledges”. The 
Handbook has been a key tool for the UNHCR  in this regard over a period of more than 
thirty years,121so that even with respect to well-settled legal questions, the courts in their legal 
decisions today frequently draw upon the UNHCR Handbook for guidance in relation to the 
central idioms of refugee law. In a case of 2002,122 the Supreme Court of Ireland had to 
inquire into the meaning of the “well-founded fear of persecution” and it observed that 
“the Handbook gives a general analysis of this crucial phrase.”123  The Supreme Court then 
concluded with regard to the trial judge, that it had been “appropriate for him to have regard 
to the Handbook…” 124  More recently, a UK appeals tribunal criticized the fact-finding 
tribunal below for dis-believing an asylum-seekers account for reasons that he had been 
unable to provide any corroboration of his account, referring to the distinctively original 
contribution of the Handbook to our understanding of refugee law. The appeal tribunal 
declared that: “It is well-established principle of asylum law that refugees should not be 
 
117 Michael Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook, 6th ed. (London: Hart Publishing, 2008).  
118 Mark Symes and Peter Jorro, Asylum Law and Practice, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009). 
119 Stanley A. de Smith, Lord Harry Woolf, Jeffrey L. Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 6th ed. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2009). 
120 Ian A. Macdonald and Ronan Toal, Macdonald’s Immigration Law & Practice, 8th ed. (London: 
Butterworths, 2010). 
121 T v Immigration Officer, [1996] AC 742 (HL(Eng)); Birungi v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[1995] Imm AR 331; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Murat Akdogan, [1995] Imm AR 
176; Dirisu, R (on the application of) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, [2001] EWHC Admin 970.  
122 Z v Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform, [2002] IESC 14 (Supreme Court of Ireland).  
123 Ibid. The guidance in the UNHCR Handbook can be found at: supra note 76, paras 37-42.  
124 Ibid., para 30. 
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expected to produce documentary corroboration of their claims. The origins of this principle 
are to be found in paragraph 196 of the UNHCR Handbook.” 125  In another case from 
Northern Ireland, the High Court accepted, when inquiring into the question of how standards 
of probability and assessment of future risk operate in refugee law that, “[t]he UNHCR 
recognises the balance of probabilities coupled with, where appropriate, the benefit of the 
doubt, as an acceptable approach.”126 These judicial dicta all confirm the value of emerging 
normative standards, and their role in unfolding legal process and illuminating key legal 
concepts. It is reminiscent of what Halliday and Shaffer describe in Transnational Legal 
Orders127 as the need to explore “new concepts of ‘global’ and ‘transnational’ law to make 
sense of legal processes that are not adequately captured by the concept of international 
law.”128 For Halliday and Shaffer, this necessity follows from “a collection of formalized 
legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the 
understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions.”129   
‘Pre-Convention’ Palestinian refugees were not the only ones posing difficulties for 
refugee assessment boards and tribunals applying the Refugee Convention of 1951. Another 
group was the ‘post-Convention’ refugee escaping wars and civil strife, who also was not 
specifically catered for in the 1951 Refugee Convention, and yet became the archetypal 
modern refugee after the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan,  and Syria in the late twentieth century.  
This was the ‘war refugee’ and it is to this category to which we must finally now turn. 
 
5. War Refugees 
Modern refugee law is fast realizing that armed conflict is the root cause of human 
displacement. It creates “war refugees” who are forced to seek safety elsewhere. Where an 
asylum-seeker cannot demonstrate the risk of individual “persecution,” and therefore does 
 
125 Judge Bruce in PA059052016, [2017] UKAITUR PA059052016 at para 16. The Judge sets out paragraph 
196 of the Handbook that: “It is a general legal principle that the burden of proof lies on the person submitting a 
claim. Often, however, an applicant may not be able to support his statements by documentary or other proof, 
and cases in which an applicant can provide evidence of all his statements will be the exception rather than the 
rule. In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and very 
frequently even without personal documents....” 
126 ON -v- Refugee Appeals Tribunal & ors, [2017] IEHC 13 at para 62 (High Court, Ireland).  
127 Terrence C. Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, “Transnational Legal Orders,” in Transnational Legal Orders, 
eds. Terrence C. Halliday and Gregory Shaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 4.  
128 Ibid., where they refer to Twining (2000); Tamanaha (2007); Berman (2012); Zumbansen (2010); Shaffer 
(2013).  
129 Ibid., 5.  
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not fall into the category of refugees as defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention,130 but is 
nevertheless at serious risk of a threat to their life, liberty and security, the international 
community has found protection in other ways. Historically, the requirement of “persecution” 
nevertheless stood in the way.  This is why when the UNHCR Handbook131 dealt with “war 
refugees” it did so only under the heading of “Special Cases.”132 The UNHCR Handbook  
noted that “[p]ersons compelled to leave their country of origin as a result of international or 
national armed conflicts are not normally considered refugees under the 1951 Convention or 
the 1967 Protocol.”133 Yet, it still recognized an exception and concluded  that, “[h]owever, 
foreign invasion or occupation of all or part of a country can result–and occasionally has 
resulted–in persecution for one or more of the reasons enumerated in the 1951 Convention.134 
The result was to emphasize the central importance of the requirement of “persecution” in 
international refugee law.  
A particular problem arose, however, when the Handbook alluded to the concepts of “foreign 
invasion” and “occupation” alongside that of “persecution” because the former concepts were 
drawn directly from the realms of international humanitarian law, while “persecution” was 
specifically a concept of international refugee law only taken from the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. The UNHCR Handbook nevertheless struggled to bring “war refugees” fleeing 
foreign invasion or occupation within the ambit of the 1951 refugee law system observing 
that,  
refugee status will depend upon whether the applicant is able to show that he 
has a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ in the occupied territory. It will 
also depend  upon whether or not he is able to avail himself of the protection 
of his government, or of a protecting power whose duty it is to safeguard the 
interests of his country during armed conflict, and whether such protection can 
be considered to be effective (emphases added).135  
 
130  See, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 art 1A(2) (entered into 
force 4 October 1967), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/v2prsr.htm.  
131 See UNHCR, supra note 77.  
132 Ibid., Chapter V, para 164.  
133 Ibid. This provision goes on to add that, “They do, however, have the protection provided for in other 
international instruments, e.g. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the Protection of War Victims and the 1977 
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the protection of Victims on International 
Armed Conflicts.” Nevertheless, the general position is clear that the Refugee Convention 1951 does afford 
immediate protection. 
134 See UNHCR, supra note 77, Chapter V, para 165.  
135 Ibid., para 165.  
 28 
Nevertheless, because direction given in the UNHCR Handbook in  this section is  that, 
“…every case has to be judged on its merits,”136 this has meant that the plight of “war 
refugees” has remained an intractable one for the world ever since.137  Clearly, therefore, the 
UNHCR has not been able to resolve everything that it has had to grapple with.  
The regional systems which fell outside the 1951 Refugee Convention come again into play 
today because over half a century after the passage of the Refugee Convention in 1951, it was 
European Union law that developed a basis of protection for refugees which was itself not 
grounded on the requirement of “persecution.” This, in turn, was achieved by means of an 
EU Directive, which now stands to make a direct impact on the practice of international law 
in this area. The countries of the European Union already allowed failed asylum-seekers to 
remain on their soil by granting them forms of “subsidiary protection” (also sometimes 
referred to as “humanitarian protection”), as persons seeking asylum who do not qualify as 
refugees, an example of how domestic law drives international law. Extolling the virtues of 
the EU, Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White explained, “that the future of 
international law is domestic” in that “the future of international law lies in its ability to 
affect, influence, bolster, backstop, and even mandate specific actors in domestic politics.138 
Indirectly, “[i]nternational law and the international community” are able “to intervene in and 
influence what were previously the exclusive jurisdiction and political process of national 
governments.”139   
With armed conflict in mind, and therefore eschewing any reference to “persecution,” Article 
15(c) of the EU Qualification Directive (Council Directive 2004/83/EC), which augmented 
the establishment of the Common European Asylum System,140 required only that there is a 
risk of “serious harm” to the individual asylum-seeker. This was defined, inter alia, as a 
 
136 Ibid., para 166.  
137 Hugo Storey, “Armed Conflict in Asylum Law: The ‘War-Flaw,’” Refugee Survey Quarterly 31, no. 2 
(2012): 1-32, 18. He argues that refugee law’s “inability to deal effectively with armed conflict related claims is 
related in its conspicuous failure, or unwillingness to recognise that international law regards international 
humanitarian law as the lex speclialis in situations of armed conflict” and that “the human rights paradigm 
remains stuck trying to analyse such situations in exclusively international human rights law terms.” (at p.1). 
However, for a contrary view see, Jean-Francois Durieux, “Of War, Flows, Laws and Flaws: A Reply to Hugo 
Storey,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2012): 161-176, 174, where he critiques Hugo Storey.  
138 Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White, “The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, The 
European Way of Law),” Harvard International Law Journal 47, no.2 (2006): 327-352), 350.  
139 Ibid., 352. They end with the words that, “The EU is a great experiment with precisely this type of system, 
although one underpinned by a unique history and culture generating the necessary domestic political will….”  
And that “[t]he world is not likely to replicate this experience….”  
140 QD, supra note 84 at para 8.  
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“serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate 
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.” 141  In this way, “war 
refugees” were now able to invoke Article 2 of the Qualification Directive, which provides 
for “subsidiary protection.” This new form of protection was designed as a substitute to 
refugee protection. Protection from removal was granted to “a third country national…who 
does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin … would face 
a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15 … and is unable, or, owing to 
such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.”142  See 
citation below.  
In the landmark case of Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (Elgafaji )143 in 2009, the 
CJEU explained how Article 15 (c) was to be implemented. It suggested a “sliding scale” of 
internal or international armed conflict vis-à-vis the protection afforded so that, “the more an 
applicant is able to show that he is specifically affected by reason of fact which is particular 
to his own circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence is needed for him to 
be eligible for subsidiary protection.”144 Elgafaji shaped the scope and criteria of application 
of Article 15 (c). Lord Burns, in a subsequent judgment, explained that the effect of Elgafaji 
is that “[i]f the claimant can demonstrate that he is at particular risk of harm by reasons of 
factors particular to his personal circumstances, a lower level of indiscriminate violence may 
be required to be shown for him to be eligible for the subsidiary protection under 
article 15(c).”145  
In Aboubacar Diakité v Commissaire Général Aux réfugiés et aux Apatrides,146 a second 
decision of the CJEU dealing with Article 15(c), the meaning of “internal armed conflict,” 
 
141 EC, Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status 
of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International 
Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, [2004] OJ, L 304/12, article 15. In full, Article 15 defines 
the serious harm as follows: “Serious harm consists of: a. Death penalty or execution; or b. Torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or c. Serious and individual threat 
to a civilian life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of  international or internal armed 
conflict.” 
142 Ibid., article 2(e).  
143 Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, C-465/07, [2009] ECR I-921[Elgafaji].  
144 Ibid., at para 39.  
145 Opinion of Lord Burn In the Petition H.A.H (ap) For Judicial Review of a Decision of the Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, [2014] ScotCS CSOH 110 at para 28 (where Lord Burns drew upon paragraph 39 of 
Elgafaji).  
146Aboubacar Diakité v Commissaire Général Aux réfugiés et aux Apatrides, C-285/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:39.  
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was explained for the purposes of applying the directive. It was said that “[t]he usual 
meaning in everyday language of ‘internal armed conflict’ is a situation in which a State’s 
armed forces confront one or more armed groups or in which two or more armed groups 
confront each other.”147 Nevertheless, as subsequent decisions have affirmed,  to qualify for 
protection under Article 15(c) a person fearing a risk of “serious harm” would still need to 
demonstrate that indiscriminate violence was at a high level.”148 
CONCLUSION  
In this concluding section, we summarize how the interests and aspirations of refugee law 
have shifted from the earliest time immediately following World War II; what the role and 
significance of refugee law has become today; what questions refugee law answers today, 
and which ones it does not answer. These questions are important and arise at a critical point 
in our history, because some 70 years after World War II the paradigm of the international 
system has shifted. The world has changed and is changing in ways that we cannot yet 
predict. In 2016, the US under President Trump decided to exit global agreements, such as 
the Paris Pact149  and the Trans Pacific Partnership. 150  Meanwhile, the UK embarked on 
 
147 Ibid., at para 28.  
148  See, AA (Article 15(c)) (Rev 2) Iraq CG, [2015] UKUT 00544 at para 86 (IAC) (UK Upper Tribunal, 
Immigration and Asylum Chamber), which draws upon para 30 of Diakite, which is as follows: “30 . 
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the existence of an internal armed conflict can be a cause for 
granting subsidiary protection only where confrontations between a State's armed forces and one or more armed 
groups or between two or more armed groups are exceptionally considered to create a serious and individual 
threat to the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection for the purposes of Article 15(c) of Directive 
2004/83 because the degree of indiscriminate violence which characterises those confrontations reaches such a 
high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, if returned to the relevant country or, 
as the case may be, to the relevant region, would - solely on account of his presence in the territory of that 
country or region - face a real risk of being subject to that threat (see, to that effect, Elgafaji, para 43).”  The 
applicable CJEU jurisprudence is also referred to in MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG, [2014] 
UKUT 442 at para 30-33 (IAC) (UK Upper Tribunal, Immigration and Asylum Chamber).  
149 This agreement, which is designed to deal with greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, adaptation, also known 
as the “Paris Climate Accord” or the “Paris Climate Agreement” is an agreement within the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was to start in 2020.  The aim of the Agreement was to 
tackle global climate change by keeping global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels 
in this century. Temperature rises were thereafter to be limited to 1.5 degrees Celsius. The Agreement was 
negotiated at the 21st Conference of the Parties of the UNFCC in Paris on 12th December 2015 by 
representatives of 196 parties, and 195 UNFCCC members had become party to the Agreement by November 
2017  (see, “Paris Pact on Water and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Basins of Rivers, Lakes, and 
Aquifers,” United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, 
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150 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), signed in February 2016, by 12-countries that border the Pacific Ocean, 
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negotiating Brexit. Yet, both the USA and the UK had been instrumental in creating the very 
edifice of the international system after World War II. All around us, nation states are 
increasingly turning inwards. A renewed nationalist vigour abounds.151  The efficacy and 
effectiveness of a transnational legal order is in question. Wolfgang Streeck argues that we 
are entering “a period of uncertain duration in which the old order is dying but a new one 
cannot yet be born” where the old order was “the state system of global capitalism” and that 
“what the still to be created new order will look like is uncertain” so that we are now in what 
Antonio Gramsci termed, an “interregnum.”152 This makes the inquiry into refugee law all the 
more compelling.   
 
 
In the context of the here presented analysis, we have demonstrated the shift away from 
identifying the “persecution” of victims and towards a hostile and deeply xenophobic rhetoric 
and discourse through which refugees are described in relation to their flight from events 
while they are associated with the disruption of and even threat to  “public order”, ”security”, 
by representing a “foreign invasion”. 153  Yet, despite such mis-characterisation the stark 
reality is that the northern richer States of the West must deal with the “war refugees” who 
become  displaced in the face of a “serious harm” which can arise from “indiscriminate 
 
first ratify it, in order for it to take effect. before it could come into effect. US President Donald Trump had 
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Steve Turley, The New Nationalism (2018). Also see, Gideon Rose, “The New Nationalism”, Foreign Affairs, 
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violence” in situations of armed conflict. The present exodus from countries like Syria, Iraq 
and Afghanistan attests to the importance of that shift. Emerging norms remain incomplete 
and under-developed. However, because states differ in their responses, with some requiring 
an individualized threat, whilst others looking to establish the level of violence, and yet 
others are not interested in individualizing the threat at all. Moreover, the courts require there 
to be a high level154 of indiscriminate violence without a clear threshold for what constitutes 
“indiscriminate violence” in a country. Does it refer to the whole territory or part of the 
territory?  Is “indiscriminate violence” an agreed definition?  If so, how is it agreed?  Does it 
refer to the intensity155  of violence, the geographical spread of violence, the number of 
casualties, or the nature and frequency of violent acts.  Can sporadic violence fit the formula? 
Or, is “indiscriminate violence” to be considered cumulatively?  
 
Second, take the “individual” who is fleeing a war zone. What should be the basis for an 
“individual threat” to civilian life?  What if the “indiscriminate violence” is not linked to the 
“armed conflict” in the country? In such as case, is protection denied?  If it is not denied,  and 
protection is granted in such cases, upon what legal basis is it granted? Is the threat meant to 
be to any hypothetical individual in a situation of “indiscriminate violence”?  Or, is it 
individualised to the specific person who presents himself before the authorities concerned? 
 
154  See, AA (Article 15(c)) (Rev 2) Iraq CG, [2015] UKUT 00544 at para 86 (IAC) (UK Upper Tribunal, 
Immigration and Asylum Chamber), which draws upon para 30 of Diakite, which is as follows: “30 . 
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the existence of an internal armed conflict can be a cause for 
granting subsidiary protection only where confrontations between a State's armed forces and one or more armed 
groups or between two or more armed groups are exceptionally considered to create a serious and individual 
threat to the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection for the purposes of Article 15(c) of Directive 
2004/83 because the degree of indiscriminate violence which characterises those confrontations reaches such a 
high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, if returned to the relevant country or, 
as the case may be, to the relevant region, would - solely on account of his presence in the territory of that 
country or region - face a real risk of being subject to that threat (see, to that effect, Elgafaji, paragraph 43).” 
The applicable CJEU jurisprudence is also referred to in MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG, 
[2014] UKUT 442 at para 30-33 (IAC) (UK Upper Tribunal, Immigration and Asylum Chamber). Should this 
be the same as footnote 120?  
155 As the EctHR explained at para 241 in Sufi and Elmi v The United Kingdom, No 8319/07 and 11449/07, 
[2011] ECHR 1045, “Although the Court has previously indicated that it would only be “in the most extreme 
cases” that a situation of general violence would be of sufficient intensity to pose such a risk, it has not provided 
any further guidance on how the intensity of a conflict is to be assessed. However, the Court recalls that the 
Asylum and Immigration Tribunal had to conduct a similar assessment in AM & AM (armed conflict: risk 
categories) Somalia CG, [2008] UKAIT 00091 (UK, Asylum and Immigration Tribunal), and in doing so it 
identified the following criteria: first, whether the parties to the conflict were either employing methods and 
tactics of warfare which increased the risk of civilian casualties or directly targeting civilians; secondly, whether 
the use of such methods and/or tactics was widespread among the parties to the conflict; thirdly, whether the 
fighting was localised or widespread; and finally, the number of civilians killed, injured and displaced as a result 
of the fighting. While these criteria are not to be seen as an exhaustive list to be applied in all future cases, in the 
context of the present case the Court considers that they form an appropriate yardstick by which to assess the 
level of violence in Mogadishu.” 
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It will fall to the domain of TRL to answer all of these questions.  Who the “actors” and 
“norm entrepreneurs” will be remains yet to be seen. Even if there is a clear answer to these 
questions, it is not clear who is a “civilian.” Article 15 (c) requires there to be a “threat to a 
civilian’s life or person.”  But what if the “civilian” is also a combatant? From Syria to 
Pakistan, there are now “part-time fighters” engaged in armed struggles.  What if someone 
“off-duty” is killed?156  The formula in Article 15 is such that states differ in their practical 
responses to these questions.  Some states choose to focus on “armed conflict” per se. Others 
choose to focus on “indiscriminate violence.” Some states are apt to individualise threat.  
Others set out to establish the level of violence. Yet, some again, are not interested in 
individualising the threat at all. The “sliding scale” of protection throws up many more 
problems than it resolves. Everything suggests from this that TRL will grow and not 
diminish. The attempt to visualize refugee law as emanating from a single authority, with a 
single agreed meaning will fail–and is indeed, seen to be failing.  
 
Third, regardless of whether the test is “persecution” or a risk of “serious harm” from 
“indiscriminate violence”, refugees invariably only succeed in gaining sanctuary if they can 
show they were lawful in the host countries, so that “[m]ost of the detailed entitlements, it 
turns out, are available only to refugees ‘lawfully in’ or ‘lawfully staying in’ the host 
country.”157 The result is that “[m]erely proving that you are a refugee under the treaty 
definition, as arduous as that process can be, does not mean that you achieve the requisite 
lawful status” if a claimant does not have a legal right to remain pursuant to relevant 
domestic law and “[t]his is why the 1951 Convention is not a treaty about asylum and why, 
as refugee-law writings frequently repeat, there is no individual right of asylum in 
international law.”158 In short, “t]he Convention is, as the title advertises, a treaty about the 
status of refugees–and primarily about the status of those refugees that the state has chosen, 
in its discretion, to treat as lawfully present.”159 See citation below. David A. Martin rightly 
reminds us that in the aftermath of World War II and during the Cold War, such a premise 
 
156 The European Asylum Support Office’s, “Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan” recognises 
the concept of part-time civilian fighters: see, “Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan,” European 
Asylum Support Office (July 2012), Section 3.2.1, 26, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/asylum/european-asylum-support-office/bz3012564enc_complet_en.pdf.  
157  David A. Martin, “The Refugee Concept:  On Definitions, Politics, and the Careful Use of a Scarce 
Resource” in Refugee Policy: Canada and the United States, ed. Howard Adelman (Toronto: York Lanes Press, 




was likely to be uncontroversial because of the “Convention’s genesis as a document largely 
addressing technical difficulties for European refugees whose residence was, in essence, 
already in their host countries” but “that emphasis may distort understanding of our situation” 
today “when asylum-seekers almost always show up in the asylum country in an irregular 
status.”160 Again, how TRL develops the field of refugee law, in circumstances where it is 
widely accepted that the 1951 Convention is only about the status of refugees, will be a 
question that a project of TRL has to continue to uncover. 
 
Finally, modern refugee law remains incongruously focused on political violence, as a cause 
of flight, rather than also economic violence, when it is clear that many people leave their 
countries as much for the latter as for the former reason. Modern refugee law has always been 
contested for this reason. As Matthew Price has explained, “[e]specially objectionable, say 
many of the writers, is the dichotomy between political refugees on the one hand, and who 
can claim a host of legal protections, and economic migrants or displaced persons on the 
other, who cannot.”161 The result has been to give less then unqualified support to Mathew 
Price’s thesis that asylum’s function historically was always “to protect unfortunates from 
specifically political harms.” Yet today, as Gil Loescher has pointed out refugees have 
become a “distinctly modern problem” because before the twentieth century, “asylum was a 
gift of the crown, the church, and municipalities; and fugitive individuals and groups could 
expect no response to claims of asylum or protection premised on human rights or political 
right.”162 It is as well to remember, therefore, as Mathew Price has observed in “Recovering 
Asylum’s Political Roots” how “[h]historiography plays an important role in debates over 
proper conception of asylum.”163 The distinction between the political and the economic 
migrant “is particularly inept” given “the travails of the developing world” which is “the 
source of most of today’s … refugees” 164  The view has been widely echoed by other 
renowned writers in refugee law.165  Already, within forty years of the Refugee Convention 
 
160Ibid. 
161 Ibid., 30.  
162 Loescher, supra note 18, 33.  
163 Mathew E. Price, “Recovering Asylum’s Political Roots,” in Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose and 
Limits (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 24-68, 51.  
164 Ibid., 30 
165 James Hathaway, “A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law,” Harvard International 
Law Journal 31, no. 1 (1990): 129-184, 129, 150, 163-65; Michael G. Heyman, “Redefining Refugee: A 
Proposal for Relief for the Victims of Civil Strife,” San Diego Law Review 24, no.2 (1987): 449-484; Andrew 
E. Shacknove, “Who is a Refugee,” Ethics 95, no.2 (1985): 274-284, 274; Peter Singer and Renata Singer, “The 
Ethics of Refugee Policy” in Open Borders? Closed Societies?: The Ethical and Political Issues, ed. Mark 
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1951 it was being asked that “surely we ought to think again about the morality of trying to 
base an immigration policy on the difference between economic and political motivations”166 
If, going forward, new rules are to be developed in the emerging new order of the 21st 
Century – to determine as Philip Jessup once said – “the rules men live by”,  then we must 
acquire an understanding of  the “dispersal of authority,” in which the transnational legal 
order operates, in what is today an evolving international framework of emerging rules and 
norms, that is far removed from its traditionally authorised moorings. 167     
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